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I. Introduction and Scope 
The Twentieth Century saw the emergence of international and academic 
attention and scrutiny to the problem of forced population movement and displacement, 
sometimes referred to as forced migration.  It is now understood that persons who are 
forced to leave their homes tend to face humanitarian problems and human rights abuses 
as a result of their displacement.  Entire communities and populations that have been 
forced to leave their homes as a result of armed conflict, natural disasters, and/or even 
government resettlement and relocation problems have inconsistent and often insufficient 
access to humanitarian provisions (i.e., security, food, clothing, shelter, and water) and 
are at greater risk of victimization during displacement.  In addition, displaced 
populations face greater humanitarian challenges when the governing states fail to 
provide the necessary protection and/or humanitarian provisions.  As a result, studies 
about forced population displacement and movement focus on the challenges displaced 
populations face and how the state and/or the international community should respond to 
address their needs.   
What makes forced population displacement different from other forms of 
population movement is the lack of individuals’ volition or ability to decide to leave their 
homes and relocate.  Accordingly, forced population displacement refers to those who 
have been “pushed” to leave their homes, as opposed to those who are “pulled” by more 
attractive opportunities to voluntarily leave their homes.   
The many ‘push factors’ leading to…displacement can be aggregated into a range 
of overlapping categories: natural and human-made disasters, ethnic or religious 
persecution, development, and conflict.  ‘Displacement’ occurs where coercion is 
employed, where choices are restricted, and where the affected populations are 
facing more risks than opportunities by staying in their ‘place’ of residence, 
which distinguishes it from ‘voluntary’ or ‘economic’ migration.  Displacement 
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is, by definition, forced and involuntary and involves some form of de-
territorialization [where the individuals lose (cultural) ties to a place, in this case 
their home].1   
 
For this reason, voluntary population movements and individuals who leave their homes 
for economic reasons are excluded from forced population discussions, as they are 
perceived to have more volition in their decision to leave their homes.  When individuals 
leave their homes in search of better opportunities, jobs and quality of life, they retain the 
ability to decide to move. 
Voluntary and economic migration (e.g. including rural-urban and intra-urban 
movements) is more a reflection of people’s deliberate pursuit of new 
opportunities.  Displacement and resettlement become ‘involuntary’ when the 
choice to remain is not provided.  The question of ‘choice to remain’ is central to 
this dichotomy.2 (emphasis in original) 
 
Without the ability to choose to leave home, displaced populations face challenges that 
voluntary population movements do not.  
Within the study of forced population displacement, there are subsets of displaced 
populations, including refugees and internally displaced persons.  Article 1(A)(2) of the 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 
“Refugee Convention”) defines “refugee” as an individual who: 
…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country...3 
 
After the Cold War, the flow of refugees became very problematic for countries that were 
receiving large numbers of refugees.  In wanting to address the increasing refugee flows, 
                                               
1. Robert Muggah, “A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development-induced 
Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement,” International Migration, 41, no. 5 (2003): 7. 
2. Ibid., 10. 
3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Article 1(A)(2),” Adopted 28 July 1951, United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Statelessness Persons convened under General Assembly 
Resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950. 
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greater attention was turned to addressing the root causes of refugee producing 
population displacement.  Eventually, it was recognized that not all forced population 
displacement could be categorized as “refugees.”  That is, not all individuals forced from 
their homes fled in fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion.  But they did face similar, if not worse, humanitarian problems than refugees.  
For example, other types of forcibly displaced persons who faced humanitarian problems 
like refugees include, but are not limited to, the following:  
In some instances, government counter-insurgency operations or ethnic cleansing 
campaigns could be seen to be deliberately uprooting people on ethnic or political 
grounds…In other cases, [some] could be found trapped in the midst of conflicts 
and in the direct path of armed attack and physical violence from insurgent 
forces…4 
 
In addition, not all displaced persons crossed an internationally recognized state boundary 
to gain access to the international refugee system.  The term “refugee” was too narrow to 
accurately identify the international displacement problem.  Thus, the international 
community focused its attention on forced displacement populations that remained within 
the borders of its state, now commonly referred to as “internally displaced persons” 
(IDPs): 
[I]nternally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been 
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.5 
 
While refugees and IDPs fall under the umbrella of forced population displacement 
debates, discussions about refugees and IDPs are actually quite different. 
                                               
4. Roberta Cohen, “Developing an International System for Internally Displaced Persons,” 
International Studies Perspectives 7 (2006): 89.  
5. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
February 11, 1998), annex, para. 2 (hereinafter “Guiding Principles”). 
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The main distinction between refugees and IDPs is that refugees have crossed an 
internationally recognized state border and thus, are a legally recognized group in 
international law with rights to international protection of their persons and non-
refoulement (right to not be returned home), among other things.  IDPs on the other hand, 
do not have any international legal status and as such, are without international protection 
of their rights and needs.  In addition, as IDPs have not crossed a border, they remain 
within the jurisdiction (and mercy) of their governing state.  Unfortunately, not all states 
are willing or able to sufficiently protect and provide for its internally displaced 
populations, which puts IDPs at great risk of being victims of human rights abuses and 
makes them one of society’s most vulnerable groups.  Refugees, on the other hand, have 
greater access to protection in their new homes compared to IDPs.  This is not to suggest 
that the refugee system is without problems, but merely to emphasize that IDPs are met 
with significantly less international efforts for protection than refugees.  Additional 
details regarding the differences between the two groups will be further discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
What makes IDPs particularly more vulnerable than refugees is that during their 
displacement within their state, IDPs fall into “a vacuum of sovereignty, when the state is 
unable, or refuses, to assume its responsibilities towards its own population.”6  In 
situations where the state is unwilling or unable to protect its refugee population who 
flees in fear of persecution and who cross an internationally recognized state boundary, 
refugees still have their rights and protection guaranteed by states party to the Refugee 
Convention.  Unfortunately, IDPs remain hidden behind traditional concepts of state 
                                               
6. Catherine Phuong, The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 212. 
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sovereignty and the internationally accepted principle of non-intervention.  After the 
Thirty Years War in the early Seventeenth Century, states pushed for international 
recognition and acceptance of a state’s sovereign authority over the affairs within its 
territory, such as the freedom of religion.  Today, Article 2(7) of the United Nations 
Charter embodies this recognition and respect for sovereign authority:  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. 
 
The barriers of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention make it very 
difficult for international organizations to gain access to IDPs and provide them the 
needed security and/or humanitarian provisions.  Consequently, local and international 
responses are insufficient, uncoordinated and ad hoc.  Some actors only provide 
humanitarian provisions but no protection, or only get involved when states welcome 
their assistance and presence.  Without a legal status for IDPs to justify international 
interventions for humanitarian reasons, international responses towards the international 
internal displacement problem will be inconsistently and poorly applied. 
Popular media, academics and the United Nations have also acknowledged the 
growing international IDP problem.  Images of the large-scale internal displacement 
problem that has plagued the Western state of Darfur in Sudan have forced the 
international community to better understand IDPs and how to respond to them.  In 
recognizing the severity of the international IDP problem, the United Nations created the 
position of Special Representative to the Secretary-General on IDPs in the early 1990s to 
identify and address IDPs’ needs.  Former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 
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made the following comment regarding the humanitarian problem of IDPs in as early as 
1991:  
I believe that the protection of human rights has now become one of the keystones 
in the arch of peace.  I am also convinced that it now involves more a concerted 
exertion of international influence and pressure through timely appeal, 
admonition, remonstrance or condemnation…It is now increasingly felt that the 
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States 
cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be 
massively or systematically violated with impunity.  The fact that…the United 
Nations has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, 
legal or moral, against the necessary corrective action, especially where peace is 
also threatened.  Omissions or failures due to a variety of contingent 
circumstances do not constitute a precedent.  The case for not impinging on the 
sovereignty territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself 
indubitably strong.  But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the 
implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right 
of…launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian 
populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection.7 (emphasis 
added) 
 
As Pérez de Cuéllar suggests, the sanctity of state sovereignty cannot be preserved at the 
expense of human rights abuses, including and especially those experienced by IDPs.  
This is a position that has also been adopted by subsequent United Nations Secretary-
Generals, including Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan.  In 2000, the Canadian 
government sponsored a study that agreed with Pérez de Cuéllar and concluded there was 
an international “responsibility to protect” (R2P) IDPs to preserve international peace.   
As previously mentioned, studies regarding internal forcible displacement began 
as a part of the greater refugee debate.  Hence, IDPs were initially perceived to be an 
extension of the international refugee problem in the post-Cold War era.  But now the tail 
has begun to wag the dog.  Today’s IDP problem far exceeds the refugee problem where 
the number of refugees dwarfs in comparison the number of individuals who currently 
                                               
7. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 




find themselves internally displaced within their state’s borders.  Present-day studies 
involving IDPs and refugees may sometimes overlap, as they are examples of forced 
population movements, but the challenges facing both forms of displacement differ.  
Because the number of IDPs in the world today far exceeds the number of 
refugees and international responses to address IDP concerns remain ad hoc and 
insufficient, this thesis advocates for the international protection of IDPs.  Despite Pérez 
de Cuéllar’s passionate speech, the literature on how the international community should 
respond to IDPs remains divided.  Most commentators are not opposed to providing 
humanitarian assistance, such as water, food, and clothing, to IDPs.  However, some 
believe that IDPs need more than just access to humanitarian provisions – they also need 
physical protection and security.  In addition, organizations working with or for IDPs 
often face logistical problems and political challenges from both receiving and sending 
countries who do not want international interference in their domestic affairs and who do 
not want to devote resources to individuals who are not their civilians, respectively.  For 
those who argue that IDPs require security and physical protection of their person, the 
presence and/or use of armed forces may be necessary to protect IDPs, which creates a 
logistical nightmare for both the intervening actors and the receiving states. 
There are many issues that arise before, during and after displacement, such as 
addressing the root causes of displacement, how to return IDPs and/or end displacement, 
and how to enforce or guarantee protection for IDPs.  However, this thesis will focus on 
the deficiencies and discrepancies found in international law with regard to the 
humanitarian challenges IDPs face during displacement.  Such grey areas include the 
lack of systematic international legal protection for IDPs, the preservation of traditional 
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concepts of state sovereignty, and the legality of international humanitarian interventions.  
This is not to suggest that the prevention and post-displacement problems are not equally 
important and problematic.  Rather, it will be argued that the more immediate 
humanitarian concerns occur during displacement, which remain insufficiently addressed 
by states and international organizations alike.   
This thesis begins by identifying who IDPs are and exploring the evolution of the 
present-day definition of IDPs.  This historical study will elucidate some of the problems 
preventing international consensus on assigning a legal status to internally displaced 
persons.  The first section will also explore the international scale and severity of the IDP 
problem and the problems such displacement causes at the local, regional and 
international levels.  Without a legal status, internally displaced persons will only 
continue to face humanitarian and human rights problems.  And at the scale to which the 
current IDP problem exists, the aggregate human rights abuses are catastrophic, such as 
in present-day Darfur.   
The next section explores the first of two challenges in international law that 
prevents the emergence of an international normative response to protect IDPs – 
specifically, the role of traditional notions of state sovereignty in contemporary 
international affairs.  Today, concept of sovereignty and the international order have 
evolved, resulting in the concept that sovereignty is conditional.  That is, state 
sovereignty can only be legitimized and respected if the state meets certain conditions, 
such as fulfilling its obligations (i.e., security) to its people.  There is also an emerging 
belief that when a state fails to fulfill its obligations to its population, such as providing 
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for and protecting its population, then there is a correlative international responsibility to 
protect those in need.   
But for such a norm regarding the international “responsibility to protect” IDPs to 
emerge, there needs to be a legal doctrine that describes who IDPs are and explicitly lists 
the rights and provisions to which they need to have access, which the final section will 
address.  This serves as the second legal hurdle that results in insufficient international 
protection for IDPs – the lack of a binding document that specifies the legal rights of 
IDPs.  Without an internationally recognized and accepted definition of who IDPs are and 
what their needs are, future international responses will remain ad hoc, uncoordinated 
and insufficient.  
II. The Problem of Internal Displacement 
 
Internally displaced persons have regularly pointed out that security is as 
important to them as food.  Providing food and supplies without attending to 
protection can undermine assistance programs and even lead to situations in 
which the victims become the “well-fed dead.” 
 
Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng,  
Masses in Flight 8 
 
The international problem of internal displacement is alarming as the number of 
IDPs today far exceeds the number of refugees.  However, this large-scale internal 
displacement problem has only recently gained international attention and study.  This 
chapter explains the extent of the internal displacement problem on the global scale and 
outlines the humanitarian and international problems associated with internal 
displacement.  Despite the scale of internal displacement, there remain no clear 
                                               
8. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal 
Displacement (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 10. 
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understanding or international acceptance of who IDPs are and how to respond to address 
their needs.  
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Definitions 
Today’s international IDP problem emerged out of concern for refugees during 
and after the Cold War.  Refugees were forced to flee their homes owing to a fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.  As refugees were outside the country of their nationality, they 
did not have the protection of their home state.  In some instances, refugees were 
unwilling to avail themselves to the protection of their home state owing to the fear of 
persecution that forced them to flee their homes in the first place.  Thus, internal 
displacement was initially conceived and studied as contributing to the refugee problem.  
Specifically, internal displacement initially referred to refugees who did not cross an 
internationally recognized state border.   For example, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) first recognized IDPs as refugees who had 
not crossed an internationally recognized border but who were fleeing persecution.9  This 
means that such internally displaced persons should have had access to the same 
assistance and programs as refugees, but did not simply because they had not crossed an 
internationally recognized border.  
However, it was soon realized that not all displaced persons who needed 
international protection could be considered refugees.  That is, not all persons who were 
displaced who required international protection and assistance were fleeing in fear of 
persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
                                               
9. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 1997-98: 
A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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group or political opinion, nor did they find themselves outside their home state.  For 
example, there are persons who are forcibly displaced from their homes as a result of 
man-made or natural disasters who are not considered refugees.  There were also those 
who fled and who would have qualified as refugees except for having not crossed an 
internationally recognized border.  Like refugees, these displaced persons faced problems 
with their security, accessing humanitarian provisions and human rights protection.  But 
unlike refugees, such displaced persons do not have a legal right to humanitarian 
provisions and protection during their displacement.   
In the case of refugees – persons who fled across borders – the international 
community did take action.  At the end of the Second World War, in 1950, the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was created and in 
1951, the Refugee Convention was adopted.  This made it possible for persons 
subject to persecution in their own countries to find refuge on the territory of a 
foreign state.  But this system of international protection and assistance for those 
who crossed borders did not extend to persons forcibly displaced and at risk 
within their own countries…[T]hey remained under the jurisdiction of their own 
governments and largely beyond the reach of the international community.10 
 
As internally displaced persons had not crossed an internationally recognized state 
border, they were considered internally displaced, or now commonly referred to as 
“internally displaced persons (IDPs).”  Without sufficient protection or security from the 
governing state or the international community, IDPs remain more vulnerable to human 
rights abuses than refugees.  
In 1991, in its request to the United Nations Secretary-General to consider the 
protection of human rights and the needs of IDPs, the UNHCR indicated that it was 
“disturbed by the high number of internally displaced persons suffering throughout the 
world, who have been forced to flee their homes and seek shelter and safety in other parts 
                                               
10. Cohen, “Developing International System,” 87-88.  
 12 
 
of their own country.”11  This initial concern identified two elements of internal 
displacement, “that internally displaced persons have been forced to flee their homes, and 
that they remain in the territory of ‘their own country.’”12  In the 1992 United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (UNHCHR) Analytical Report of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Person (hereinafter the “Analytical Report”), IDPs were 
distinguished from refugees by incorporating these two IDP distinguishing elements: 
[Internally displaced persons were p]ersons who have been forced to flee their 
homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, 
internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made 
disasters; and who are within the territory of their own country.13 
 
This initial 1992 description of IDPs show that in contrast to refugees, IDPs could be 
considered “displaced” based on non-political factors such as natural disasters.14  
Unfortunately, this initial IDPs definition failed to identify and include all the relevant 
internally displaced persons.    
This initial 1992 IDP definition that was introduced to the United Nations faced 
major criticisms.  Specifically, the definition included persons displaced by natural or 
man-made disasters as there “had been many cases where floods, earthquakes and famine 
as well as human-made disasters, such as nuclear or chemical accidents, had uprooted 
populations, and it could not be discounted that these were also major causes of 
population displacement.”15  But critics argue that “the causes and remedies of conflict-
                                               
11. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Internally Displaced Persons 
(E/CN.4/RES/1991/25) (Geneva: United Nations, March 5, 1991), para. 3.   
12. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons (E/CN.4/1992/23) (Geneva: United Nations, February 14, 1992), para 12 
(hereinafter “Analytical Report”). 
13. Ibid., para. 17. 
14. O. Okechukwu Ibeanu, “Exiles in Their Own Home: Conflicts and Internal Population 
Displacement in Nigeria,” Journal of Refugee Studies 12, no. 2 (1999): 165. 
15. Erin Mooney, “The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced 
Persons as a Category of Concern,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2005): 10. 
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induced and disaster-induced displacement [are] different, making it ‘confusing’ to 
include both in the IDP definition.”16  While some argued that the 1992 definition was 
too broad and too inclusive, others believed the definition was too narrow as it only 
included displaced persons who fled “suddenly or unexpectedly.”17   
It has been found that a great number of people do not flee ‘unexpectedly or 
suddenly’…People may first flee to a nearby town or village in search of security 
and still go back to their farms during the day to pursue their economic normal 
activities.  If the degree of violence reaches a higher level, people then consider 
going further and leaving their property for a longer period.18 
 
Critics also saw the criteria “forced to flee” and “in large numbers” as too limiting.19  In 
reality, some displaced persons flee in small groups or even on an individual basis to 
avoid detection, to blend in to the local communities better and “make themselves less 
conspicuous…”20  Eventually, the criteria that displacement occur in “large numbers” and 
be “suddenly and unexpectedly” were removed and the “forced to flee” criterion was 
expanded.  
Taking these suggestions into consideration, the former Special Representative to 
the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons Francis Deng recommended a 
revised IDP definition in his 1998 report to the United Nations titled, Guiding Principles 
of Internally Displaced Persons (“Guiding Principles”): 
[I]nternally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been 
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
                                               
16. Roberta Cohen, “For Disaster IDPs: An Institutional Gap,” Brookings Institute, August 8, 
2008, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0808_natural_disasters_cohen.aspx. 
17. Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight, 17. 
18. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Internally Displaced Persons: Report of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Profiles of Displacement: Colombia 
(E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.1) (Geneva: United Nations, October 3, 1994), para. 13.  
19. Phuong, International Protection, 33.   
20. Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight, 17. 
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of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.21 
 
The revised 1998 IDP definition removed the temporal and quantitative requirement of 
being “suddenly or unexpectedly [displaced] in large numbers.”22  The word “obliged” 
was added to working IDP definition to encompass situations where individuals “were 
obliged to leave their homes, as for instance with the forced evictions of minorities 
during the war in Bosnia or…in the summer of 2005, in Zimbabwe with the home 
demolitions and forced removal of more than half a million people.” 23  In addition, the 
phrase “within the territory of their own country” was altered to those “who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border, to reflect the possibility of sudden 
border changes, for instance as had occurred with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”24 
The language of the 1998 definition inherently included those displaced or 
forced/obliged to leave their homes as a result of government-sponsored displacement, 
such as during development projects.  “According to the World Bank, around 10 million 
people have been displaced by development projects every year since 1990.  The two 
main causes of displacement are dam construction and urban transportation projects.”25  
As a result, Principle 6(c) of the Guiding Principles prohibits arbitrary displacement, 
which includes displacement in “cases of large-scale development projects, which are not 
justified by compelling and overriding public interests.” 
                                               
21. Guiding Principles, para. 2. 
22. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/39, 
(E/CN.4/1998/53) (Geneva: United Nations, February 11, 1998), para. 19.   
23. Mooney, “Concept of Internal Displacement,” 11. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Phuong, International Protection, 30-31. 
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In resolution 43/131, “Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters 
and Similar Emergency Situations,” the United Nations General Assembly also 
recognized “that displaced persons outside the original definition of refugees [needed to 
be] within the scope of international, and therefore UN, concern.”26  Hence, displacement 
by natural and man-made disasters remained in the 1998 definition to address situations 
where states responded to “such disasters by discriminating against or neglecting certain 
groups on political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds or by violating the human rights of 
the affected population in other ways, thereby creating special protection needs.”27  After 
visiting the region affected by the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, current 
Special Representative to the Secretary-General on IDPs, Walter Kälin, concluded that 
“persons forced to flee their homes share many common types of vulnerability regardless 
of the underlying reasons for their displacement.”28   
The experiences of natural disasters in other parts of the world showed that there 
is a risk of human rights violations when displacement lasts and the displaced 
cannot return to their homes or find new ones after some weeks or months.  In the 
context of natural disasters, discrimination and violation of economic, social and 
cultural rights tend to become more entrenched the longer the displacement lasts.  
Often, these violations are not consciously planned and implemented but result 
from inappropriate policies.29 
 
                                               
26. Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), 11. 
27. United Nations General Assembly, Report on internally displaced persons, prepared by the 
representative of the Secretary-General (A/54/409) (Geneva: United Nations, September 29, 1999), para. 
12. 
28. Walter Kälin, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters: A 
Working Visit to Asia by the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights 
of Internally Displaced Persons (Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2005), 9. 
29. United Nations General Assembly, Report of Mr. Walter Kälin, Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons (A/60/338) (Geneva: United 
Nations, September 7, 2005), para. 41. 
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Hence, individuals displaced by natural disasters remained in the IDP definition because 
they often face similar humanitarian and human rights problems as those displaced by 
violent conflict as a result of their displacement.   
The inclusion of displacement as a result of man-made or natural disasters 
remains one of the most contested components of the 1998 IDP definition, which is now 
the most widely used and recognized definition of IDPs.  The International Law 
Association (ILA), an international non-governmental organization of lawyers in private 
practice, academia, government and the judiciary, adopted the following working 
definition of IDPs at its 69th Annual Conference in London in July, 2000: 
[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflicts, internal strife or 
systematic violations of human rights, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border.30 
 
The exclusion of displacement forced by natural or man-made disasters would leave 
those displaced persons without any recourse or international protection.  This is 
especially problematic when the governing state refuses to accept foreign humanitarian 
assistance for their population displaced by natural or man-made disasters.31  But the 
growing number of humanitarian disasters resulting from natural or man-made disasters 
and uncoordinated attempts or efforts by the governing states in the Twenty-First 
Century, such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, is 
providing a very strong case for why such forms of internal displacement must remain in 
the IDP definition. 
                                               
30. International Law Association, “Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally 
Displaced Persons, Article 1,” International Law Association, July 29, 2000, 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42808e5b4.html.  
31. David J. Scheffer, “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,” University of 
Toledo Law Review 23 (Winter 1992), 270. 
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Just like the greater forced population displacement debates do not include those 
who have some volition in deciding to leave their homes, the 1998 IDP definition also 
excludes “those who migrate because of extreme poverty or other economic reasons.”32  
As far as man-made and natural disasters are concerned, one can make a 
distinction between causes provoking slow movements of population (such as 
extreme poverty and degradation of the environment) or sudden migration due to 
chemical or nuclear accidents or to earthquakes, cyclones and floods.  Presumably 
the resolution does not cover the slow population movements which does [sic] not 
provoke suddenly an emergency situation but focuses on sudden and involuntary 
migration requiring immediate action on the part of the international 
community.33 
 
Hence, this separation emphasizes the distinction between those who are coerced to flee 
their home and those who “choose” to migrate for economic reasons.  While those who 
leave their homes for economic reasons may face problems such as discrimination, they 
are not considered to face similar or greater humanitarian challenges and human rights 
abuses on the scale that IDPs face when they are forced to leave their homes. 
Another problem with the 1998 definition that has not been heavily discussed by 
United Nations is the discussion about when displacement ends.  Presumably, 
displacement would end when IDPs are able to return home.  However, the definition of 
“home” has not yet been clarified for the purposes of returning IDPs.34  Critiques on this 
criterion have gone back and forth and many have tried to define “home” as the 
community of origin, the physical house the IDP used to live in, etc.  Some critics argue 
that because IDPs remain within the borders of their country, they are “home.”  Others do 
not believe that IDPs can ever really return home, especially in situations where their 
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homes are destroyed in natural disasters and must be re-built or where there is someone 
else occupying their home.  In other instances, IDPs displaced by natural disasters may 
lose their homes to climate change, soil erosion, rising sea levels, etc.,35 and do not have 
a home to which to return.  In some situations, IDPs do not need to return home to end 
their displacement.  For example,  
In some cases, the displaced may have integrated economically and socially into 
another area and may not choose to return home.  They may no longer feel secure 
in their home areas even though the government or the international agencies and 
NGOs assisting the displaced believed they could safely return.  Or they may be 
unable to return because their land and homes have been occupied by others…In 
the view of some observers, displacement ends when returnees have both security 
and the means to reestablish themselves in their areas of origin.36 
 
Refugees are granted the protection of non-refoulement, the right to not be returned 
home.  It remains unclear whether IDPs can be granted a similar right.  Opponents fear 
that without a cessation clause clearly defining when displacement ends, international 
assistance and intervention will continue on an ad hoc basis, which defeats the purpose of 
creating a uniform definition applied in all situations.   
The search for criteria and mechanisms to determine when an internally displaced 
person ceases to be internally displaced may not appear to be very meaningful.  
Likewise, to determine when a victim of human rights violations ceases to be a 
victim is not especially helpful.  Protection and assistance to the internally 
displaced should cease when their needs are fulfilled.  This can only be 
determined on an ad hoc basis after a general assessment of the political and 
socioeconomic situation, as well as a specific assessment of the situation of a 
particular IDP group.37 
 
Despite the lack of a cessation clause, the 1998 IDP definition remains the most widely 
used and referenced working definition of IDPs used by the United Nations and other 
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international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. 
International Scale of IDP Problem 
Internal displacement is not a new problem, but the international recognition and 
acceptance of internal displacement as a problem is new.  Internal displacement is often 
viewed as a post-Cold War phenomenon because international concern regarding internal 
displacement initially emerged with the refugee problem.  However, internal 
displacement occurred during the Cold War.  “The fact of the matter is that some of the 
major cases of internal displacement over the past two decades are related to conflicts 
affected by cold war policies.”38  The politics between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union increased the internal displacement problem exponentially as it 
“contributed heavily to the crisis of governance in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that 
led to large-scale displacement.”39  Specifically, the Cold War proxy wars “played a 
dominant role in other conflicts that uprooted millions…during the 1980s, most notably 
in civil wars…in Central America, and in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia.”40   
Despite the internal displacement problem that existed during the Cold War, the 
international community was initially concerned with addressing the causes influencing 
refugee movement.  After the fall of the former Soviet Union, borders were redrawn and 
many nationalist movements were no longer suppressed.  These often left individuals on 
the wrong side of the border or were caught in internal conflicts, creating large numbers 
of forcibly displaced populations who found themselves displaced both within and 
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outside their home state.  As a result, the number of refugees after the Cold War began to 
rise, which placed a heavy burden on states party to the Refugee Convention.  
The international refugee system had been overloaded since the early eighties and 
industrial states took various opportunities, ranging from the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to the European construction, to reshape and restrict refugees’ 
access to asylum…The end of the Cold War prompted a redefinition of agendas 
and of UN activities.  This collided with the crisis of the refugee regime owing to 
an increased number of forced migrants and the disappearing hospitality of 
industrialised nations…[The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] 
acknowledged the structural crisis of the refugee regime…[and] claimed that it 
could no longer ignore the links between internal and external displacement.41 
(emphasis added)   
 
The United Nations Security Council agreed that the “massive flows of refugees were a 
threat to international peace and security.”42  For example, the exodus of Hutus and 
Tutsis from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan as a result 
of the 1994 Rwandan genocide created a regional problem involving Rwanda’s 
neighbors.  Hutus and Tutsis living or seeking refuge in the DRC and Sudan became 
involved in the internal conflict between the Huts and Tutsis in Rwanda.  As a result, the 
study and preoccupation with internal displacement emerged in an attempt to identify and 
address the root causes of refugee movement from the Cold War.43  
As IDPs were initially identified in relation to the refugee problem, early 
literature on IDPs labeled them “internal refugees,” referring to those who fled their 
homes owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, but remained 
inside, rather than outside, their country of nationality.  By defining internal displacement 
in relation to refugees, the international community initially believed that internal 
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refugees should have the same access to international protection guaranteed to all 
refugees whether they remained within their home country or crossed an internationally 
recognized border.  Hence, internally displaced persons were initially perceived to have 
similar rights and protections as refugees.   
Because internal refugees remained within the borders of its state, international 
attempts to protect internal refugees resulted in “in country protection,” which refers to 
providing protection for refugees who remained within the borders of their home state.  
By providing protection to would be refugees who remained within their state, in country 
protection has been criticized for being a policy that contains and prevents refugees from 
accessing the refugee and asylum institutions.44  Despite these concerns, in country 
protection became an international necessity by the end of the Cold War.  For example, 
during the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, Turkey closed the border it shared with Iraq, 
denying Iraqi Kurds who were fleeing in fear of persecution based on their ethnicity 
refuge in Turkey.45  Despite remaining within their home country, these fleeing Iraqi 
Kurds otherwise qualified as refugees and deserved the same access to protection and 
humanitarian provisions as other refugees.  Hence, Operation Provide Comfort, which 
was led by the United States, provided in country protection and humanitarian aid to the 
Kurdish refugees who remained in Iraq.   
The evolution towards providing in country protection to internal refugees opened 
discussions regarding providing international protection to displaced persons who 
remained within the borders of their state.  Insufficient international responses to 
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internally displaced persons exacerbated the humanitarian crises persons faced during 
displacement, especially when they remained within their country.  While IDPs may have 
initially been conceived as part of the refugee debate, it is now clear that the IDP problem 
far exceeds the refugee problem.  The Special Representative to the Secretary-General on 
IDPs soon realized that the displacement problem included more than those who were 
internal refugees, but faced similar problems and needs, which they shared as a displaced 
population.  Hence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “developed an 
interest in working with IDPs in the early 1990s in order to ensure ‘preventive protection’ 
and contain would-be refugees.”46  
It was also recognized in the 1990s that the internal displacement problem far 
exceeded the refugee problem that initially plagued the international community.  “When 
IDP statistics began in 1982, only 1.2 million people were internally displaced in 11 
countries.”47  In 1992, the United Nations reported an estimate of 17 million refugees 
compared to the 24 million IDPs in the world.48  “By 1995, there were an estimated 20-25 
million IDPs in more than 40 countries, almost twice the number of refugees.”49  In some 
cases the number of internally displaced in fact may be even higher, “given the reticence 
of Governments to admit the existence of the problem and considering that there is no 
institution charged with collecting the information.”50  The United Nations has regularly 
cited similar statistics when emphasizing the severity of the international IDP problem.  
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In 2007 and 2008, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IMDC), established by 
the Norwegian Refugee Council, reported approximately 26 million IDPs in conflict-
related situations involving at least 52 countries.  “This is the highest figure since the 
early 1990s, and marks a six percent increase from the 2006 figure of 24.5 million.”51  In 
addition, the IMDC also reported that there were 4.6 million people newly displaced in 
2008, which “represented an increase of 900,000 compared to the same total in 2007[,]” 
when there were 3.7 million newly displaced.52  It is also “estimated that internal 
conflicts are forcing the flight of an estimated 10,000 persons daily.”53  Refer to Figure 1 
for a map illustrating the global scale of the internal displacement problem.  
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Figure 1 – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Internally Displaced Persons Worldwide, August 
2009,” www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/httpWorldMap?ReadForm&count=1000. 
At best, these numbers are only guestimates as the nature of displacement makes 
it very difficult to identify and count the exact number of internally displaced persons.  
Some IDPs intentionally hide among new communities for security reasons54 and 
“disperse so as to avoid identification, which makes access [identifying and counting 
IDPs] more difficult.”55  In addition, institutions and countries have varying IDP statistics 
as they implement differing methodologies in considering who IDPs are and how to 
count them.  For example, the U.S. Committee for Refugees only considers IDPs to be 
“those who would be ‘refugees’ if they were to cross an international border”56 although 
others may include those displaced by natural and man-made disasters in the IDP count.  
Regardless of the exact number of IDPs in the world, it is generally agreed that IDPs 
today far exceed the number of refugees.  
Problems IDPs Create 
 
Less attention has been paid to the problems displaced persons create during their 
displacement, but internal displacement is not just a problem that plagues the governing 
state.  Large-scale forced population displacement can have far reaching negative 
ecological, political, economical and social impacts.  In some cases, internal 
displacement has led to the depopulation of entire communities and even entire regions,57 
which has been documented to have negative long-term impacts on the communities and 
environments they left behind.  Consider the following example in Afghanistan: 
With departures from rural areas, the human resources needed to maintain 
adequate levels of cultivation dwindled.  In irrigated areas, canals fall into 
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disrepair and cannot be easily rehabilitated.  A decade of such neglect in 
southwestern Afghanistan caused extensive, perhaps irreparable, damage to 
patterns of cultivation there….Furthermore, crops that demand constant attention, 
as does coffee, will suffer ill effects for years to come (plants will deteriorate and 
the quality of harvests will decline) if they are abandoned for even a single 
season.58 
 
In addition to their negligence to the environment, IDPs can also directly and negatively 
affect on the environment.  For example, during displacement Rwandan IDPs and 
refugees fed off the Akagera National Park and settled in the Nyungwi and Gishweti 
forests, damaging those ecosystems.59   
 Despite remaining within their home state, IDPs can also create local, regional 
and international problems.  The rise in the number of IDPs foreshadows the potential 
mass exodus that can occur from one country into another, thereby putting additional 
strain on international refugee and asylum programs if IDPs cross a border and qualify 
for those international statuses.  Even if IDPs cross a border but do not qualify as 
refugees or asylees, IDP presence in another/bordering country can potentially have 
destabilizing effects, especially in already politically volatile regions.  This list is just to 
name a few of the problems associated with large-scale forced population displacement, 
but list is by no means exhaustive or comprehensive.  
Challenges Facing IDPs 
 
As persons displaced from their homes, IDPs often have little or no protection of 
their persons or human rights from their governments, making them one of society’s most 
vulnerable groups.  “When individuals are on the move, it is more difficult to ensure that 
their human rights are protected.”60  The IMDC indicated there were approximately 11.3 
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million IDPs in at least thirteen countries as of December 2007, who did not have any 
significant humanitarian assistance from their governments and 9.3 million IDPs in at 
least ten countries where the governments were indifferent or hostile to their protection 
and humanitarian needs.61   
The specific needs of IDPs vary depending on their location and the 
circumstances surrounding their displacement.  But IDPs share some common traits and 
challenges.  For example, IDPs “are often composed largely of women and children, and 
often are predominantly of rural origin.”62  In addition, “[d]isplacement is often created 
by, and in turn results in, crisis in which the rights normally taken for granted – physical 
security, shelter, food, water, health care and basic amenities – are acutely 
compromised.”63  Kälin provides the following overview of the problems IDPs face:  
As persons who left their homes involuntarily, internally displaced 
persons…confront specific problems and needs that are different from those who 
may remain at home.  While in flight, they may be attacked or cross into mine 
fields in areas they do not know.  Families might be separated, with members 
losing contact with one another.  Once they arrive at their destinations, they need 
food, shelter, and access to health services.  Often they are not welcomed by the 
host population but suffer discrimination.  Their children may encounter 
difficulties in getting a proper education.  IDPs in many countries run higher risks 
than those remaining at home of having their children forcibly recruited, of 
becoming the victims of gender-based violence, or of remaining without jobs [or] 
other means of livelihood…64  
 
The United Nations has also reported that some of the “highest mortality rates ever 
recorded…have come from situations of internal displacement, where the death rates 
among internally displaced persons have been as much as 60 times higher than those of 
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non-displaced within the same country.”65  In addition to the humanitarian challenges 
IDPs encounter, internally displaced populations face the possibility of “de-skilling” in 
protracted displacement situations.  Certain segments of the displaced populations are 
uneducated and without skills to be a functioning member of that population.  The loss of 
skills within certain societies can have negative impacts as de-skilling “alters the 
structure and size of households and changes family patterns and gender roles.”66    
Kälin and the United Nations’ assessment only provide a glimpse of the problems 
IDPs face when they are displaced during non-violent situations.  In armed conflict 
situations, IDPs face additional humanitarian challenges such as: 
…IDPs were victims of summary executions, torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, forced recruitment, sexual violence and looting of their 
property…Displaced women and girls were at increased risk of sexual violence, 
including rape and exploitation…[and] were exposed to significant health risks 
due to their lack of access to reproductive and maternal health care in areas of 
displacement…A specific threat facing displaced children was forced recruitment 
by armed groups.  Family separation and other risk factors deriving from 
displacement put children in danger of forced recruitment…In the majority of 
countries affected by internal displacement, children lost access to education and 
were forced to work in order to survive.67  
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, which provides humanitarian assistance to 
victims of war and internal violence, also notes that IDPs are at risk of creating tension in 
hostile communities, increased risk of sexual violence and are sometimes used “as a tool 
or even as a method of warfare by parties to a conflict.”68  
Internally displaced persons typically have suffered from a series of human rights 
violations which add up to a characteristic and distinctive syndrome.  The 
cumulative effect of these violations, together with the fact of having been forced 
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to flee their home and the difficulties, risks and deprivations invariably associated 
with their new situation, make their needs qualitatively different from those of 
other persons.69 
 
Hence, IDPs face a wide variety of humanitarian problems and challenges that arise 
during short term and long term displacement and where displacement occurs in violent 
and non-violent environments.  
 As previously mentioned, despite the variety of challenges IDPs face during their 
displacement, there has been an insufficient and uncoordinated international approach in 
responding and/or protecting internally displaced persons.  There is no standard 
international response to IDPs whether they are displaced under violent or non violent 
circumstances, or whether their displacement is short term or long term.  For example, in 
non-violent situations, IDPs lack access to economic, social, and civil rights during the 
time of their displacement and sometimes even during their attempt to return home.70   
[Unlike refugees, as] no one agency is specifically mandated to address the needs 
of internally displaced persons, international responses to their plight are highly 
uneven.  In some situations, the needs of the internally displaced are met to 
varying degrees but in others they are largely neglected or not addressed at all.  
Even in situations where the international community has extensive humanitarian 
operations, the attention that it provides to the internally displaced may be less 
than the need requires.  Moreover, protection does not constitute a primary area of 
concern for many of the international agencies involved with the displaced.71 
 
Part of the problem to coordinating an international response to IDPs is the lack of 
understanding of who IDPs are and the circumstances requiring international 
involvement.   
 In recognition of this uncoordinated and insufficient international response to 
IDPs, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1991 requested the 
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Secretary-General initiate a system-wide review to assess the coordination of assistance 
to displaced persons.  In 1991, the UNHCHR also requested the Secretary-General to 
consider the protection of human rights and the needs of IDPs in this system-wide 
review.72  In 1992, the consultant to the Secretary-General on this issue confirmed that 
IDPs faced human rights problems such as the right to food, shelter and adequate living 
conditions, health care, life and personal integrity, work and adequate wages, family 
unity, and education.  In addition, the consultant noted that IDPs lacked the freedom of 
residence and movement and the freedom of thought, association, expression and 
assembly.73  Given these considerations, the United Nations has embarked on the elusive 
task of trying to identify IDPs and create an internationally recognized definition of IDPs 
in hopes of laying the foundation for a normative framework towards providing 
protection for IDPs.  
Conclusion  
The international scale of internal displacement, which far exceeds the present-
day international refugee problem, requires closer attention and study.  The sheer number 
of internally displaced persons is expected to continue to destabilize local, regional and 
international peace if their problems and presence remain unaddressed.  Large-scale 
displacement, often seen as a symptom of potential state failure or rising civil unrest, is 
especially problematic for the governing states and their neighbors.  In addition, IDPs 
crossing into another state can sometimes destabilize already sensitive regional political 
relationships.  For those who qualify, IDPs who cross a state border also threaten to 
overburden the already overburdened refugee institution. 
                                               
72. Analytical Report, para. 1-2.   
73. Ibid., para 42-73.   
 31 
 
The reason that IDPs have recently gained greater international attention is not 
because internal displacement is a new problem.  Rather, it is now known that the IDP 
problem far exceeds the refugee problem, and that IDPs continue to face day-to-day 
challenges that prevent them from having adequate or sufficient protection and access to 
humanitarian provisions.  The humanitarian atrocities that have emerged from the 
Rwandan genocide and the civil war that has lasted almost a quarter of a century in Sudan 
demonstrate what does happen when there is no adequate international response to IDPs.   
However, no standardized international response exists on how to appropriately 
and adequately respond to IDPs.  The deficiencies in the international response to IDPs 
will continue if there is no explicit recognition of who IDPs are and the needs and 
challenges they face during their displacement.  While the 1998 working IDP definition 
may be widely recognized and applied by international institutions such as the United 
Nations and the Red Cross, it is still not a legally binding document and grants IDPs no 
legal rights or status.  But the lack of a legal status for IDPs is only the first problem to 
creating a standardized response to IDPs.  
III. International Responsibility to Protect Internally Displaced Persons 
 
I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital 
protection to small and weak states.  But to the critics I would pose the following 
question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common 
humanity? 
 
   Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary-General 
United Nations Millennium Report 2000 74 
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 As briefly discussed in the last section, even as persons displaced within their 
state, the United Nations has recognized that IDPs pose an international problem – their 
presence may destabilize a region or a border, and/or become refugees and overburden 
the already troubled refugees institution.  However, the general acceptance of the 
international IDP problem has not yet produced any standardized international responses 
that appropriately and sufficiently address IDPs’ problems and needs during all 
circumstances surrounding their displacement.  For example, there is more international 
attention to IDPs when their displacement is a result of civil unrest or if they are caught 
in a violent conflict.  In addition to the lack of a legal status afforded to IDPs, the second 
legal hurdle preventing an international norm from emerging regarding how to respond to 
IDPs is the concern regarding the legitimacy of foreign actors and states who intervene in 
a state’s domestic affairs, even for humanitarian reasons.  Specifically, because IDPs 
have not crossed an internationally recognized state border, they remain within the 
domestic jurisdiction of that governing state.   
 This section examines the traditional concept of state sovereignty, how it has 
evolved over time, and the role sovereignty plays in contemporary international affairs.  
Humanitarian disasters such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 have prompted the 
international community to consider whether there is an international “responsibility to 
protect;” to conduct humanitarian interventions to prevent or limit humanitarian 
atrocities.  IDPs are a good example to demonstrate the debate between sovereignty and 
international responsibility because they remain within the domestic jurisdiction of their 
governing state, but face grave humanitarian problems that are difficult for the 
international community to ignore.  In addition, this section reviews the debates regarding 
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the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions to elucidate the arguments against 
establishing a common international response to IDPs. 
Legitimizing Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 There are varying definitions and perceptions of permissible intervention, as well 
as the obligations associated with humanitarian interventions, if any even exist.  In its 
broadest definition, “intervention refers to external actions that influence the domestic 
affairs of another sovereign state.”75  More importantly, some critics argue that “the state 
on the receiving end must not consent to the action” in order for it to be truly considered 
an intervention.76  But the reason why interventions should be considered in response to 
IDPs is because “[i]n international society, intervention…[is] the most visible and 
perhaps most consequential ways of enforcing standards of conduct…”77  Specifically, In 
intervention is “understood to be aimed at governments…and so provided a way of 
bringing about political change without disturbing the Vienna boundaries and territorial 
settlement that underpinned the entire European order of the period.”78  Hence, in order 
for humanitarian interventions to be successful, they must enforce or shape international 
standards of conduct toward IDPs.  
 However, the type of acceptable and legitimate intervention for humanitarian 
purposes remains highly debated.  For example, soft intervention refers to intervention in 
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the form of a “discussion, examination, and recommendatory action”79 or it can “be 
simply a speech designed to influence domestic politics in another state.”80  But less 
coercive forms of interventions such as speeches and economic sanctions may not have 
the effect of correcting the behavior that the intervention seeks to influence.  On the other 
hand, hard intervention generally “refers to the adoption of measures that (unlike soft 
intervention) are coercive but do not involve the use of force, such as economic and other 
kinds of sanctions…”81  Examples of hard intervention can include, but are not limited to, 
“transporting relief workers into the territory of a sovereign state to deliver humanitarian 
assistance…”82   
 Lastly, and probably one of the most controversial forms of intervention, involves 
the use of force, also known as forcible intervention.  Proponents of humanitarian 
interventions argue that interventions that aim to address humanitarian concerns can only 
be successful with the use of force: 
[T]he threat or use of force by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or 
ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied.83   
 
However, the use of force poses the one of the strongest challenges against the legitimacy 
of humanitarian interventions today as the presence of armed forces seemingly distorts 
the humanitarian nature of interventions.  Instead, the presence of armed forces makes it 
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seem as if the intervening states or organizations have other motives for such 
interventions.  For example, humanitarian interventions can serve as a disguise for 
powerful states to “impose their own culturally determined moral values on weaker 
members of international society…”84 much like during the period of colonialism that 
fulfilled the white man’s burden.85  The underlying assumption, as realists argue, is that 
states would only act to pursue their national interest and would not “risk their soldiers’ 
lives unless vital interests are at stake.”86 
 In addition to the use or presence of armed forces, another controversy related to 
humanitarian interventions is the timing of these interventions.  It is difficult to determine 
whether humanitarian interventions should serve only as a response to an already existing 
crisis or be utilized as a preventive measure.  Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to 
determine ahead of time whether humanitarian interventions will be preventive in nature, 
achieve its intended goal(s), or merely create more problems.  It can also never be known 
“in advance that more lives will be saved by intervention than will be lost by it, or that 
the means employed will not take on such a character that the moral credentials of the 
intervenors [sic] begin to look little different from those they are fighting against.”87  
Hence, the debate about the timing and permissibility of humanitarian interventions is 
divided between those who believe that the ends justify the means and those who argue 
that the means justify the ends.  But it would still be “wrong to make success the defining 
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test of legitimacy in such cases, since this would lead to the conclusion that we can judge 
the legitimacy of an intervention motivated by humanitarian reasons only with the benefit 
of hindsight.”88  In the end, these criticisms of humanitarian intervention do not argue 
about whether humanitarian interventions should occur.  Rather, they merely point out 
that humanitarian interventions face operational challenges and that mechanisms must be 
in place to check and/or limit these problems. 
Sovereignty as Authority 
 A discussion regarding the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, and 
interventions in general, require a corresponding examination into the issue of state 
sovereignty.  Interventions of any kind for any reason directly violate the traditional 
concept of state sovereignty that emerged after the Thirty Years’ War in the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.  Prior to the outbreak of Thirty Years’ War, the Reformation 
movement in Europe challenged the absolute and authoritarian rule of the Catholic 
Hapsburgs and the Catholic Church.  This war became a war where states fought to 
maintain their right to religious freedom.  With this, states wanted the authority to 
conduct the domestic affairs within their territory.  As a result, “the treaties of Westphalia 
formally recognized the existence of separate sovereignties…The settlement thus created 
a new international covenant based on state sovereignty, which displaced the medieval 
idea of the Respublica Christiana.”89  
 The Westphalian sovereignty that emerged in the mid Seventeenth Century 
emphasized the “unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing 
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within it…”90 and is often referred to as sovereignty as authority or authoritarian 
sovereignty.  “Instabilities and disorder, it was believed, were severe obstacles to a stable 
society and could only be overcome by viable governments that could firmly establish 
‘sovereignty’ over territory and populations.”91  Because man’s inherent state of nature is 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short in a state of anarchy, Thomas Hobbes argued that  
“security for individual human beings…could be guaranteed…by the radical 
subordination of individual or group will, judgement [sic], and capacity to threaten or 
endanger, to the unified will and judgement [sic] and the effectively imposed coercive 
authority of a sovereignty power.”92  In other words, the sovereign state is “an authority 
that is supreme in relation to all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction, and 
that is independent of all foreign authorities.”93  Hence, the international principle of non-
intervention emerged as a corollary to the recognition and acceptance of state 
sovereignty.  “If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that other state have a duty 
to respect that right by, among other things, refraining from intervention in its domestic 
affairs.”94  The non-intervention principle was also included in the United Nations’ 
Charter to recognize and accept states’ sovereign authority.  Article 2(7) of the Charter 
states,  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. 
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To maintain the sovereign authority over the domestic affairs within its territory, 
“[e]xternally, there was no room for any overarching intervening authority comparable to 
the [head of the state].”95  As a result, traditional forms of state “[s]overeignty entail[ed] 
the right of states to be free from interference.”96   
 Critics of sovereignty fear that states may use this authoritarian sovereignty to 
shield the human rights violations occurring within their territory.  “Sovereign states are 
expected to act as guardians of their citizens’ security, but what happens if states behave 
as gangsters towards their own people, treating sovereignty as a licence [sic] to kill?”97  
States that fail to “meet the standards prescribed for membership in the international 
community…[are] likely to assert sovereignty and cultural relativism in an attempt to 
barricade itself against alleged foreign interference.”98  It is the tension between state 
sovereignty and the humanitarian abuses within state territory that has forced the 
international community to question whether absolute sovereignty is still applicable and 
relevant in the Twenty-First Century.   
The Collapse of Sovereignty 
 On the other hand, critics of traditional sovereignty argue that the concept of 
authoritarian sovereignty has collapsed.  According to this view, there is “nothing that is 
inevitable or sacrosanct about the sovereign state system.  It is a human arrangement 
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from start to finish, meaning it is historical.  It could change fundamentally.”99  For 
example, some have interpreted the principle of non-intervention in the UN Charter as 
not giving states a shield behind which they can hide their actions and human rights 
abuses: 
“Domestic jurisdiction” [in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter] does not 
exempt everything within sovereign borders from the scrutiny of the international 
community any more than the domestic jurisdiction of the city of Toledo shields 
its government and residents from the reach of Ohio state law, federal law, or, for 
that matter, international law.  In the past, the United Nations found that 
“domestic jurisdiction” was no bar to de-colonization or anti-apartheid actions.  
Similarly, a state’s treaty obligations – many of which can deeply penetrate 
national sovereignty and territorial borders – cannot be regarded as “domestic 
jurisdiction.”100 
 
In fact, the last clause of Article 2(7) allows for exceptions to the non-intervention 
principle, such as in situations that prevent the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, which deal with the maintenance of peace by the 
Security Council.  If sovereignty was once considered sacrosanct, today it has evolved so 
that states no longer have such sovereign authority.  
 The erosion of sovereignty is more prevalent in contemporary international affairs 
as states grow more interconnected and interdependent on each other in the Twenty-First 
Century.101   
In the context of a highly interconnected global order, many of the traditional 
domains of state activity and responsibility (defence, economic management, 
communications, administrative and legal systems) cannot be fulfilled without 
resort to international forms collaboration.102   
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Specifically, globalization has led to an “’internationalization’ of domestic activities and 
an intensification of decision-making in international frameworks.”103  In the case of the 
European Union, states “pool” their sovereignty “into a common ‘supranational’ 
institution in which they no longer make decisions independently.”104  The decisions of 
individual states not only affect its population and its territory today,105 rather, it can have 
regional and/or international ramifications.  In addition, the decision-making process that 
was traditionally controlled by state leaders is now influenced by other states, grass root 
mobilization, international organizations and international bi- and multi-lateral 
agreements.   The emergence and increasing role of non-state actors, trans-national actors 
and international institutions are increasingly influencing state agenda.106 
These long-term trends [economic interdependence, interventions in the domestic 
affairs of states after the Cold War, and delegitimization of colonialism] have led 
not only to an erosion of traditional sovereignty, i.e., to a reduction in the 
autonomy of the state and in its actual power, but also to a striking diffusion of the 
state’s influence beyond the borders of the sovereign state: through the 
mechanisms of the world economy and the operations of international and 
regional organizations, states have an increasing capacity to affect others, either 
deliberately…or as result of its domestic policies and practices.107 
 
As long as interdependent economic relations and memberships in international 
organizations continue to exist, state sovereign authority over its territorial border will 
remain porous.   
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 Despite the recognition that sovereignty is evolving with the emergence of non-
state actors and international institutions, there is evidence that some sovereignty remains 
intact.108 
[A]ny claim that a world of [non-state actors and non-governmental 
organisations] is displacing the system of sovereignty states – rather than merely 
operating under their jurisdiction is and protection – is misleading.  Globalisation 
presupposes the existence of the system of states.  The states system opens and 
secures a space for transnational activity, making it feasible to conduct operations 
and engage in transactions on an international plane.  Non-state actors and 
organisations operate within that system, and not outside it…[I]t is still the case 
that sovereign states and the great powers in particular, both individually and 
jointly, carry the heavy responsibility for arranging and sustaining international 
order which at base is a diplomatic and military enterprise.  Non-state actors and 
organisations are not responsible and could not be made responsible for that.109  
 
There is no doubt that the traditional concept of sovereignty that emerged from the Peace 
of Westphalia has changed.  How much and to what extent that sovereignty has changed 
continues to be contested and debated.   
Conditional Sovereignty 
 Between the two extremes of the spectrum regarding the extent to which 
sovereignty still exists in modern day international affairs is the argument that 
sovereignty is conditional.  Conditional sovereignty is premised on the political and 
philosophical arguments in support of the “social contract,” where a state must meet its 
obligations to its citizens and fulfill its raison d’être.  According to John Locke, 
individuals enter into a social contract with its government, giving up some rights in 
return for the protection or guarantee of other rights.  “[T]he state exists as a discretionary 
association for the mutual advantage of its members, and the government as an agent 
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whose duty is to serve the basic interests of those members.”110  For example, in return 
for giving up certain individual liberties, the state is expected to provide security.  Hence, 
political theorists contend that sovereignty is directly linked to the state being able to 
fulfill these obligations to its people.   
 Conditional sovereignty can also be understood as sovereignty that denotes 
responsibility – or sovereignty as responsibility, a term coined by Francis Deng. 
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility…has a threefold significance.  First, it 
implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the 
safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.  Secondly, it suggests 
that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and 
to the international community through the UN.  And thirdly, it means that the 
agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable 
for their acts of commission and omission.111  
 
Hence, if states do not fulfill its obligations to its people, then it loses its claim to 
legitimate rule and sovereign authority.  In other words, “if the raison d’être of the state 
is the provision of protection, no state which actively menaces its own subjects can have 
a sound claim to their dutiful obedience.”112  
[B]ecause the ultimate justification of the existence of states is the protection and 
enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in 
substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists 
and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as 
well.113 
 
When states lose their legitimate claim to sovereignty, the international community must 
consider what should be done and what their obligations are to protect those in need and 
step in for the faltering government.  As a result, the loss of sovereign claim to authority 
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opens the door for the support of international humanitarian interventions to fulfill the 
residual international responsibility to protect. 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) IDPs 
 The international responsibility to protect suggests that the international system of 
states, and other international actors, must carry the burden of stepping in and acting on 
behalf of the state that is unwilling or unable to protect and/or provide for its citizens.  
The idea that states have responsibilities that extend beyond the domestic jurisdiction of 
their territory have been previously applied in an attempt to regulate and maintain 
international order and peace. 
To the idea of international society was added a sense of responsibility [after the 
defeat of Napoleon] on the part of the major states; those states agreed that they 
were responsible for maintaining order in international relations through a set of 
principles and institutions about which they basically agreed.114 
 
Hoping to prevent another Napoleonic era and to maintain a balance between states in the 
international order, the Westphalian sovereignty was forced to evolve.  
Four institutions eventually developed to maintain order and stability in a 
decentralized system of international relations in which resources are unequally 
distributed: a balance of power to prevent the rise of a preponderant state and to 
contain unlimited aggression; the codification of rules of behavior through 
international law; the convening of international conferences to settle major 
differences; and the growth of diplomatic practices through which states would 
maintain continuing contact and be encouraged to negotiate differences among 
themselves.115 
 
Even today, “all states – including major powers – limit their control over their own 
affairs by the treaty obligations that they assume and by their participation in 
international organizations.”116  As traditional sovereignty continues to evolve and shape 
the international order, states increasingly accept that its obligations extend beyond those 
                                               





within their borders.  For example, the United Nations sought to maintain a balance 
between the international community of states, but it required states to respect the treaties 
and provisions created by an external entity, in this case the United Nations.   
 Indeed, beginning in 1948 with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the subsequent drafting and adoption of a large number of 
human rights treaties, an evolution began to take place from a strictly state-
centered system in which sovereignty was absolute to one in which the behavior 
of states toward their own citizens became a matter of international concern.117 
 
If states are willing to adhere to universal norms of human rights, then a similar argument 
can be made in support of establishing an internationally recognized legal status and 
rights for IDPs.  Such formulation would require states to forego as much of their 
sovereign authority as they already do for current human rights treaties. 
Prior to World War II, the protection of individual human rights was primarily 
perceived to be the responsibility of the state.  While Western European countries and the 
United States got involved in “Latin America and the Caribbean to rescue nationals 
caught in situations of civil strife or to establish or protect special rights and privileges 
for Europeans and Americans[, r]arely…did they intervene to protect foreign nationals 
from their own governments” with the exception of slavery.118  But after the Holocaust, 
the international community became more concerned with the rights and protection of 
foreign nationals and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide was signed.  “[I]t would be preposterous to suggest that there is a universal 
negative duty not to commit genocide but that there is no positive duty to protect 
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intended victims.”119  It is “morally intolerable” to say that the “only clear bearer of a 
default duty to protect people against genocide is the one organization most likely, 
judging from historical experience, to have orchestrated the genocide, the victim’s own 
state.”120  In addition, in 1951, the Refugee Convention was adopted to address the 
international humanitarian problem plaguing refugees.   
Unfortunately, the politics of the Cold War, with the exception of decolonization, 
temporarily immobilized the international community against acting on human rights 
issues again.121  After the Cold War, there was a proliferation of armed conflict within 
states that “centred on demands for greater political rights and other political objectives, 
demands that were in many cases forcibly suppressed during the Cold War.”122  These 
new security issues have also shaped how violent conflicts play out, where forcible 
population displacement is sometimes an intentional objective.123  For example, “regimes 
have launched campaigns of terror on their own populations, sometimes in the name of 
an ideology; sometimes spurred on by racial, religious or ethnic hatred; and sometimes 
purely for personal gain or plunder.”124   
Accordingly, a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human 
atrocities emerged “to raise the consciousness of nations to the plight of peoples within 
sovereign borders.  There is a new commitment – expressed in both moral and legal terms 
– to alleviate the suffering of oppressed or devastated people.”125  This new concern 
evolved into the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, which refers to providing  “life-
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supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk.”126  The R2P terminology 
emerged from a report released by an independent commission, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  In 2000, the Canadian 
government established the ICISS to investigate and study current humanitarian problems 
and the idea of the international responsibility to protect, which is premised on 
conditional sovereignty argument.127   
[S]overeign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that 
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by 
the broader community of states.128 
 
The report agreed that right of state sovereignty implied responsibility, primarily the 
responsibility for the protection of the state’s population.  States that are “too weak to 
feed their people, or too ravaged by civil wars to maintain a minimum of order” were 
considered “failed sovereigns.”129  In addition, internal displacement constituted a 
“‘symptom of state dysfunction’ to the extent that the state persecutes members of its 
own population and causes them to flee, or fails to protect them from persecution by non-
state agents or the effects of a natural disaster which causes them to flee.”130   
To take the conditional sovereignty argument one step further, the ICISS report 
suggests that where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert 
such humanitarian dangers, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
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responsibility to protect131 and that “a residual responsibility also lies with the broader 
community of states” to assume those unmet state responsibilities.132   
First, [the responsibility to protect] implies that the state authorities are 
responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and 
promotion of their welfare.  Secondly, it suggests that the national political 
authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international 
community through the UN.  And thirdly, it means that the agents of states are 
responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of 
commission and omission.133 
 
Even defenders of sovereign authority like Michael Walzer recognize that an exception 
can be made to state sovereign and recognize that humanitarian interventions are morally 
defensible.  
[N]onintevention is not an absolute moral rule: sometimes, what is going on 
locally cannot be tolerated.  Hence the practice of “humanitarian intervention” – 
much abused, no doubt, but morally necessary whenever cruelty and suffering are 
extreme and no local forces seem capable of putting an end to them.  
Humanitarian interventions are not justified for the sake of democracy or free 
enterprise or economic justice of voluntary association or any other of the social 
practices and arrangements that we might hope for or even call for in other 
people’s countries.  Their aim is profoundly negative in character: to put a stop to 
actions that, to use an old-fashioned but accurate phrase, “shock the conscience” 
of humankind.134 
 
It is because humanitarian atrocities often “shock the conscience” that an international 
response is necessary, even when it infringes on traditional norms of state sovereignty. 
[O]ne surprising specific limit on state sovereignty is dictated by the nature of 
fundamental individual rights.  Every effective system of rights needs to include 
some default, or backup, duties – that is, duties that constitute a second-line of 
defence requiring someone to step into the breach when those with the primary 
duty that is the first-line of defence fail to perform it.135 
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In recognition of the importance of individual human rights, there must also be both a 
negative and a positive international duty to ensure those rights are guaranteed and 
protected.136   
While the politics of the Cold War temporarily froze international responses to 
international human rights issues, the international community was more willing to 
respond to international humanitarian crises after the Cold War ended.  In the 1990s, the 
images brought by the media, including the twenty-four hour reporting CNN channel, 
affected domestic opinion that “pressur[ed] policymakers into taking humanitarian 
actions.”137   
Experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, and in particular, Somalia show that 
the local powerholders [sic] can obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
unduly benefit by confiscating it.  Therefore, the ability to meet the humanitarian 
criteria requires at least some armed protection of the convoys and deliveries.138 
 
Unfortunately, international responses to humanitarian crises were not uniformly 
implemented during the 1990s.  For example, there was a lack of international fervor for 
getting involved in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 until after most of the killings had 
occurred.   
 International humanitarian responses slowed again after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th on the World Trade Towers in New York, City, which brought about fear 
of retaliation and global terrorism.  Some believe that September 11th “spell[ed] the end 
of Western intervention for the purposes of protecting individuals and minorities in 
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danger.”139  In fear of such retaliation, the post-September 11th world order has 
“dampened Western states’ enthusiasm for criticizing the treatment of civilians within 
other sovereign jurisdictions.”140  Specifically, “states that were previously subject to 
international criticism for internal repression have skillfully deflected attention by 
labeling their actions as ‘counter-terrorist.’”141   
 But like the lull in international concern that appeared during the Cold War, the 
lull in international concern for human rights atrocities in the post September 11th world 
may only be temporary.  The United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World 
Summit accepted the concept of the international responsibility to protect: “[I]f national 
authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts 
to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to held 
protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations.”142  It remains to be seen 
whether the comments made in the 2005 World Summit will have any lasting impact on 
international institutional responses to humanitarian atrocities that continue to plague the 
international system of states.   
Conclusion 
 The role of the state and its sovereign authority over its domestic affairs in 
contemporary international affairs remain sensitive topics today.  Some states are more 
willing to be an active member in the international community of states and are thus more 
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willing to forego its staunch advocacy for absolute state sovereignty.  On the other hand, 
some states are less willing to accept international involvement and interference in their 
domestic affairs, such as its internally displaced populations; they argue that the “state 
system endures, even if states increasingly share authority with intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations.”143  Regardless of the extent to which sovereign 
authority exists or does not exist, there is an emerging argument that the international 
community has a correlative responsibility to step in on behalf of the state to protect 
those facing humanitarian crises.   
A precedent for international involvement in states’ domestic affairs has already 
been set, with the creation of international organizations like the United Nations and the 
signing of several international human rights treaties.  States cannot presuppose to enter 
into such international agreements without having to give up some of its authority over 
the affairs within its boundaries.  Furthermore, when a state is unable or unwilling to 
fulfill its “social contract” obligations to its population, the state loses legitimate claim to 
absolute authority and tacitly grants permission for other states or organizations to 
intervene.  Because traditional concepts of sovereignty have started to degrade in some 
instances and because there is an international responsibility to protect, interventions can 
be justified on humanitarian grounds.  And as internally displaced persons continue to 
face challenges that are the result of their state’s inability or unwillingness to provide 
sufficient protection and humanitarian assistance, there is indeed an international 
responsibility to protect IDPs.  However, it remains to be seen how this international 
responsibility can be best fulfilled. 
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IV. International Law Concerning Internally Displaced Persons 
 
[B]ut if we wait until the emergency is upon us, it will come too late to save those 
who have been killed or forcibly displaced.   
 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers 144 
 
State sovereignty and the legality of humanitarian interventions are not the only 
legal hurdles preventing the international community from recognizing and fulfilling its 
responsibility to protect IDPs.  As briefly mentioned earlier, IDPs are currently without a 
legal status of their own and face significant problems with protection and accessing 
humanitarian provisions.  However, critics of increasing IDP protection would suggest 
that as members of society, IDPs are inherently already protected under existing 
international law and do not require a legal status of their own like refugees.  For 
example, during peaceful times, IDPs are protected under existing human rights law.  In 
situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law “curb[s] and restrain[s] 
armed hostilities so as to limit individual human suffering, of both soldiers and civilians, 
in times and places of war.”145  But it is inconceivable that existing humanitarian and 
human rights law provide sufficient protection to IDPs given the sheer number of IDPs 
that continue to exist in the world today and the humanitarian problems they continue to 
face.  Even if one could make the argument that there was sufficient protection for IDPs 
in today’s international law, the United Nations has agreed that “a consolidation and 
evaluation of existing norms would be of value and would provide the basis for filling 
whatever gaps may exist.”146  
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 This chapter will first review existing legal doctrines within humanitarian and 
human rights law that apply to IDPs.  However, it will become obvious that existing legal 
provisions for IDPs overlap, contradict each other, are not enforceable, and lack 
sufficient clarity and protection.  As a result, to solve the problem of insufficient 
protection for IDPs in international law, and to address how the international community 
should fulfill its responsibility to protect, IDPs require a legal doctrine recognizing who 
they are and detailing their rights.  The end of this section reviews how an international 
norm towards protecting IDPs can be established by creating such a legal doctrine and 
status for IDPs. 
Humanitarian Law 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL), often known as the law of armed conflict or 
law of war, defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent and neutral nations and 
individuals engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and to non-combatants and 
civilians.147  IHL not only dictates how states conduct war, but also allows organizations 
and non-state actors to be involved in the conflict to provide humanitarian relief.  The 
most common referred to documents in IHL are the four treaties that make up the Geneva 
Conventions, which were adopted from 1864 to 1949, and its two Additional Protocols of 
June 8, 1977. 
It is difficult to discuss IHL without making reference to the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement148 as one of the organization’s founders also laid the 
foundation for humanitarian law.  In the mid-Nineteenth Xentury, Henri Dunant and 
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General Guillaume-Henri Dufour, two of the five founding members of the Movement, 
expressed grave concerns regarding the human suffering they witnessed in the battles 
between France/Sardinia and Austria. 
On 24 June 1859 the armies of France and Sardinia engaged Austrian forces near 
the northern Italian village of Solferino.  This decisive battle in the struggle for 
Italian unity was also the most horrific bloodbath Europe had known since 
Waterloo: in ten hours of fierce fighting, more than 6,000 soldiers were killed and 
more than 30,000 wounded.149   
 
During a business trip, Dunant passed by the battle site at Solferino and stopped to help 
the wounded.  Dunant wrote of the pain and suffering that he witnessed at Solferino in 
Un Souvenir de Solferino (A Memory of Solferino), which would later inspire the creation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international standards 
regulating the conduct of war and the treatment of non-combatants.   
The battle of Solferino led Dunant to push for the creation of a neutral and 
impartial organization to protect and assist the war wounded (ICRC).  He also 
suggested that voluntary relief societies should be established to care for the 
injured – an idea that would eventually lead to the formation of National Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies.  In addition, he proposed that an international 
principle be created to serve as the basis for these societies, an idea that developed 
into the Geneva Conventions…150 
 
Developing Dunant’s visions, unofficial representatives from sixteen states attended the 
1864 Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss government, where the 
representatives adopted the Geneva Convention “for the amelioration of the condition of 
the wounded in armies in the field.”   
The Geneva Conventions are characterized by: 
[S]tanding written rules of universal scope to protect the victims of conflicts; its 
multilateral nature, open to all States; the obligation to extend care without 
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discrimination to wounded and sick military personnel; respect for and marking of 
medical personnel, transports and equipment using an emblem (red cross on a 
white background).151 
 
The Geneva Conventions would continue to protect the “wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
members of the armed forces (First and Second Conventions), prisoners of war (Third 
Convention), and civilians, particularly when they are in enemy territory and in occupied 
territories (Fourth Convention).”152  The Geneva Conventions applied to both 
international (Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocol I) and non-international (Article 3 
of the four Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocol II) armed conflicts, such as in 
situations of internal strife and civil war.153  Hence, IDPs who find themselves forcibly 
displaced during or as a result of violent conflict would be considered non-combatants 
and come under the protection of IHL. 
Specific IDP protection under IHL can be found in varying sections throughout all 
four Geneva Conventions.  Common Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions 
indicates that individuals who are not actively participating in the conflict must be 
“treated humanely.”  In addition, “Article 59 of the 1949 [Fourth] Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War obliges all parties of an 
international conflict to permit free passage for humanitarian assistance such as food 
delivery.”154  The 1977 Protocol I lists the protection to which civilians, which inherently 
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includes IDPs, are entitled in the event of “displacements due to international armed 
conflict.”155  Article 17 of Protocol II also prohibits forced movement of civilians: 
The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons 
related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative 
military reasons so demand.  Should such displacements have to be carried out, all 
possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be 
received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition.  [In addition, c]ivilians shall not be compelled to leave their own 
territory for reasons connected with the conflict.156 
 
Besides explicitly listing the individual rights of civilians to protection in armed conflict 
situations, IHL also explicitly grants civilian access to humanitarian assistance during 
armed conflict situations.  
Article 18(2) requires the government in power to accept international relief 
operations, even for the population under opposition control, if that population 
lacks the supplies essential for its survival and the relief operations are of an 
exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and are conducted without any 
adverse distinction.157 
 
In theory and on paper, IDPs should receive international protection as non-combatants in 
violent and armed conflict environments.  
However, IHL fails to provide sufficient protection to all IDPs as IHL only 
“applies only to persons displaced because of armed conflict, and only to States parties to 
Additional Protocol II,”158 which “contains the more extensive provisions protecting 
citizens in non-international armed conflicts.”159  Deng explains that in some situations, 
“tension and disturbance that fall short of armed conflict” and international humanitarian 
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law is not applicable and the protection provisions of IHL that are “critical for the well-
being or survival of the displaced” are suspended.160  This means that if a situation does 
not escalate to the level of “armed conflict,” then IHL is inapplicable and the protections 
guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II do not apply.161   
Furthermore, there is a problem of non-compliance and non-enforcement of IHL.  
Not every state in the international community has signed and ratified IHL.  Currently, 
194 countries have ratified the Geneva Conventions162 and only 163 countries have 
ratified Protocol II, which contains the provisions regarding protection of victims in non-
international armed conflicts.  The United States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Iraq are some notable countries that are absent from the list of countries who have ratified 
Protocol II.163  In addition, while IHL may be binding, there is no mechanism to enforce 
compliance.  “Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Protocol II contain any mechanism 
for bringing violations of the humanitarian law principles enshrined…to the attention of 
the international community or for enforcing the obligations contained in these 
documents.”164  Given these obstacles, humanitarian law at best only protects IDPs 
during armed conflict situations, but even IHL protection may be applied on an ad hoc 
basis. 
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Human Rights Law 
As previously mentioned, IHL does not apply to persons displaced as a result of 
internal strife or natural disasters, and other situations not considered “armed conflict.”  
But existing human rights law offers IDPs some protection to cover those gap areas. 
Human rights law applies to internally displaced persons since it applies to all 
circumstances.  When humanitarian law is not applicable, human rights law 
becomes the only source of legal protection and ensures that the human rights of 
internally displaced persons are respected.  Internal displacement often occurs in 
situations of internal disturbance or civil unrest.  In such situations which cannot 
be qualified as armed conflict (internal strife), humanitarian law cannot apply and 
some human rights can be restricted.165 
 
As is suggested in its name, human rights law should apply to all humans as human rights 
law embodies man’s natural rights.  Writing in the early Seventeenth Century, Hugo 
Grotius, also known as the father of modern international law, based his formulation of 
the international law doctrine on man’s natural rights.166   
Human rights are ordinarily understood as the rights one has simply because one 
is human being.  They are held equally by all human beings irrespective of any 
rights or duties individuals may (or may not) have as citizens, members of 
families, or parts of any public or private organization or association.  They are 
also inalienable rights, because being human is not something that can be 
renounced, lost, or forfeited.  In practice, not all people enjoy all their human 
rights, let alone enjoy them equally.  Nonetheless, all human beings have (the 
same) human rights and hold them equally and inalienably.167 
 
Specifically, Grotius felt that “natural human sociality links everyone together in an 
international society [and] this sociality gives rise to a natural law, which defines states’ 
obligations and ought to guide their actions in the international realm.”168   
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Natural law dominated international law until the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries where it was replaced by legal positivism, which is “the grounding of 
international duties in treaties and other commitments voluntarily entered into by 
sovereign states.”169  For example, in 1789, the French legislative assembly adopted the 
French Declaration of Human Rights that “remains to this day the classic formulation of 
the inviolable rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state” and incorporates “natural-law 
human rights” into “national positive law.”170  Today, human rights law defines the 
relationship between state rulers and its civilian population as it limits “the scope of 
authority which a state can exercise over individuals.”171  In other words, human rights 
law is an instrument “to protect individuals from abuses from the state: states cannot treat 
their population as they wish with impunity.”172  
There are several contemporary human rights treaties that may also apply to IDPs, 
such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide addresses freedom of residence and 
movement, which are two central features to the discussion on IDPs.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone “has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state [and] has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country.”173  In addition, the “Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights (1948) embodies the moral code, political consensus and 
legal synthesis of human rights.”174  Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights “provides that freedom of residence and movement may be subject to 
restrictions provided for by law and which are necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”175  However, 
Article 4 of the Covenant allows States to derogate from this “in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and…which is officially proclaimed.”176 
Existing humanitarian and human rights law seems to provide a variety of 
protection for IDPs, but IDPs’ continued lack of security and access to humanitarian 
provisions demonstrate otherwise.  Like humanitarian law, human rights law faces 
similar problems associated with non-binding agreements, the lack of enforcement, and 
the lack of nationalization of human rights law.  For example, according to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as of June 9, 2004, only 152 countries 
have signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.177  This means that 
the relevant provisions under ICCPR to IDPs only apply to IDPs who were within one of 
the signatory countries.  States were originally “reluctant to accuse other states of human 
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International Norm of IDP Protection 
 
The emergence of humanitarian and human rights law over a century ago 
demonstrates that the international community has always recognized and emphasized the 
necessity of protecting individuals in armed conflict situations and peaceful times 
through legal doctrine.  Even though humanitarian and human rights law today cannot be 
enforced, it does not mean that their emergence has not positively shaped international 
behavior and norms.  “Under no circumstances should the non-exercise of a duty be used 
as an excuse to suspend or abrogate a right.”179  In fact, law is often interpreted as the 
foundation for establishing and shaping social normative behavior. 
[L]aw is a deeply interconnected web of structures shaping agent action.  When 
agents succeed in changing law at one level, say, by ratifying an international 
treaty, the structure of law is such that domestic law in many states is superceded 
or, at least, pressure of domestic change (in the form of implementing legislation 
or executive action) is created.  Law, as a social form, thus connects international- 
and national-level changes in some important ways.180   
 
In the case of humanitarian and human rights law, such doctrines dictate and influence 
socially acceptable behavior regarding humanitarian issues. 
Human rights norms have a special status because they both prescribe rules for 
appropriate behavior, and help define identities of liberal states.  Human rights 
norms have constitutive effects because good human rights performance is one 
crucial signal to others to identify a member of the community of liberal states.181 
 
Legal doctrines that explicitly list the rights to which individuals need access also tacitly 
or in some cases, directly outlines how others should act and respond to guarantee and 
protect those rights.  “The attribution of a right is meaningless without the possibility of a 
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correlative duty resting somewhere”182 as “rights generate responsibilities to ensure the 
protection and well-being of individuals.  In contemporary international politics, the State 
and other authorities are the duty-bearers with responsibilities to respect and protect 
individuals’ rights.”183  For example, IDPs have a positive right to security and protection 
of their persons and a negative right to not be forcibly displaced from their homes.  
Hence, human rights “are said to have three correlative duties: duties to avoid depriving, 
duties to protect from deprivation and duties to aid the deprived.”184   
In 1996, the United Nations supported a comprehensive study to comment on 
whether there is sufficient protection and humanitarian provisions embedded in existing 
international law for IDPs.  The group of legal scholars, which included Walter Kälin, 
who would later succeeded Francis Deng as the Special Representative to the Secretary-
General on IDPs, determined “there are areas in which the law fails to provide sufficient 
protection for internally displaced persons.”  Such areas include the following: 
forcible return to conditions of serious danger; the need for personal 
identification, documentation and registration in order to ensure the means to 
exercise one’s legal rights; the protection of relief workers, their transports and 
supplies; as well as access by humanitarian agencies to provide protection and 
assistance to internally displaced persons.185 
 
The study also concluded that the specific protection and humanitarian provisions 
relevant to IDPs are currently dispersed among several human rights and humanitarian 
doctrines, which have been sporadically ratified and enforced.  Even if IDPs needs are all 
met by existing legal texts, the study determined that it would still be more beneficial to 
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create a separate document that compiled and restated all the relevant law regarding 
IDPs.  
[T]here are significant areas in which [international law] fails to provide adequate 
protection and which require remedy through restatement of existing law and 
clarification of its provisions in one document.  This would serve several useful 
purposes.  It would consolidate in one place existing norms that at present are too 
dispersed and diffuse to be effective.  It would also call attention to the need for 
the better implementation of existing norms and assist the work of Governments, 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations in the field in 
protecting and promoting the rights of internally displaced persons.  In addition, it 
would serve the educational purpose of increasing international awareness of the 
situation of the internally displaced.186 
 
Accordingly, the creation of a legal doctrine for IDPs is required to ensure that IDPs’ 
needs are explicitly outlined and met so that all organizations and actors involved have 
the same understanding of who IDPs are and what their needs are.  
The reason why an IDP doctrine is so important to shaping future understandings 
of who IDPs are and how organizations and states should respond to IDPs is because the 
emergence of legal norms prescribing the acceptable behavior regarding human rights 
can create “new expectations for conduct [that] are increasingly accompanied by new 
expectations for corrective action.”187   
Normative context is important because it shapes conceptions of interest and 
gives purpose and meaning to action.  It shapes the rights and duties states believe 
they have toward one another, and it shapes the goals they value, the means they 
believe are effective and legitimate to obtain those goals, and the political costs 
and benefits attached to different choices.188 
 
Historically, discussions regarding how best to enforce and ensure human rights norms 
are met have only come after the standards were already detailed.  Hence, a broad range 
of new international institutions and non-governmental organizations concerned with 
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monitoring and promoting the implementation worldwide of human rights and 
international humanitarian law have emerged as a result of the international recognition 
of legal norms regarding human rights violations.189  Without the foundation establishing 
who IDPs are what their needs are, in both peaceful situations and in armed conflict, 
international responses to IDPs will remain ad hoc, uncoordinated, and insufficient.  
There are several ideas on how ideas become international norms, but they share 
one common idea – in order for a norm to emerge to shape state behavior on the 
international scale, the intended normative behavior must be specifically detailed and 
outlined somewhere.  Theo van Boven, former Director of the United Nations Division 
for Human Rights, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Reparation 
to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and former Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, argues there are three steps to realizing human rights.  First, it is necessary to 
clarify at the international level of human rights and the corresponding state obligations.  
Second, establish international machineries to supervise national implementation of those 
rights and obligations.  The last step involves the consolidation and growing utilization of 
those machineries as a framework to influence sovereign states and to provide 
international access to victims of violations.190 
Others suggest a slightly different approach to creating an international normative 
response to IDPs.  Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the creation of international norm 
occurs in three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internationalization.  
Norm emergence requires the existence of a set of standards, principles and/or behavior 
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which the international community would like to become a norm.  To reach the first two 
stages, it is imperative for the intended norm(s) must reach a threshold or “tipping” point 
at which “critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.”191  “Up to the tipping 
point, little normative change occurs without significant domestic movements supporting 
such change.”192   
 After the emergence of a norm, norm cascade is “characterized more by a 
dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm 
followers...Socialization is thus the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade—the 
mechanism through which norm leaders persuade others to adhere…”193   
…at this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or 
“contagion” occurs in which international and transnational norm influences 
become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm 
change…Networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations also act 
as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and 
laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international 
standards.194 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink believe that “a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to 
enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-
esteem facilitate norm cascades.”195  In other words, “[w]hat happens at the tipping point 
is that enough states and enough critical states endorse the new norm to redefine 
appropriate behavior for the identity called ‘state’ or some relevant subset of states (such 
as a “liberal” state or a European state).”196  The last step, norm internationalization, 
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occurs when “norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of 
broad public debate.”197 
  It is important to note that this process of creating an international norm will 
occur slowly and over time.  Because of the gradual socialization that is necessary before 
other states and actors begin adopting a certain behavior, norm internationalization does 
not occur overnight or within a matter of weeks or months.   
Social influence involves the use of rewards and punishments such as back patting 
and shaming to change behavior.  It differs from persuasion in that it involves 
changed public behavior without private acceptance of the new beliefs or purpose 
underlying that behavior.  Social influence by itself, then, does not involve 
changed social purpose, but it can contribute to such changes in a variety of ways.  
The need to reduce cognitive dissonance means that people’s beliefs tend to come 
into line with their actions over time.  Thus, even if someone does not initially 
agree with the new behavioral standard they act on, over time they may come to 
accept it and internalize it as part of their belief structure.198 
 
Hence, even if a legal doctrine regarding IDPs is not initially fully recognized and 
implemented by states and other organizations, this doctrine would serve as the first step 
towards potentially internationalizing the responsibility to protect.  For example, existing 
humanitarian and human rights law, although “imperfectly implemented, these 
agreements and mechanisms have significantly changed expectations at all levels about 
what is and what is not acceptable conduct by states and other actors.”199 
There is fear that creating a legal category for IDPs would favor one minority 
group over others or prevent persons from accessing the international refugee system.  
However, an IDP legal doctrine would not exclude individuals from accessing other 
avenues towards international protection.  
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In situations of armed conflict, for instance, ensuring the protection of IDPs does 
not disqualify other civilians from the guarantees of protection to which they are 
entitled under international humanitarian law.  Generally, focusing on the 
particular problems of specific groups at risk often will be the best way to ensure 
that the group is afforded the same protection as others.200   
 
Rather, a distinct IDP doctrine would serve to be more inclusive, so that those who are 
left outside or without access to the refugee and asylum institutions are still protected.  
Hence, “the purpose of identifying IDPs as a distinct category of concern is not to 
privilege them over others but rather to ensure that their needs are addressed and their 
human rights are respected along with those of other persons.”201   
Conclusion 
The level of international displacement and the continued humanitarian 
challenges IDPs face clearly demonstrate that existing humanitrian and human rights law 
provide insufficient protection to IDPs.  Problems with enforcement and applicability of 
existing international law continue to limit the protection to which IDPs have regular 
acess.  But international responses will remain uncoordinated and ad hoc without an 
internationally agreed upon legal doctrine that specifically details and addresses the needs 
and rights unique to IDPs.  Such a legal doctrine would serve as a foundation or guideline 
for other states, international institutions, or non-state actors responding to IDPs.  It is 
hoped that eventually this legal doctrine would be further developed to outline an 
international norm regarding IDPs, such to the status that refugees have today. 
In the Twenty-First Century, the United Nations has also recently recognized the 
need to address IDPs’ rights.  In September 2004, the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights appointed Walter Kälin to replace Francis Deng as the Representative of 
                                               




the Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs.  Kälin was appointed with a mandate 
that differed slightly from Deng’s: Deng was involved with identifying the IDP problem 
and their needs, but Kälin was tasked with focusing on the rights of IDPs, such as 
identifying and protecting those rights.202  In an interview with the editors of Forced 
Migration Review in February 2005, Kälin provided the following clarification regarding 
his mandate:  
The change in title of my mandate suggests that the concept of the human rights 
of IDPs is, at least in principle, accepted today by the international community 
and indicates a certain redirection of the mandate as it puts more emphasis on the 
protection of the rights of IDPs…One of my priorities will be the development of 
a handbook to show law and policy makers how to translate [the Guiding 
Principles] into specific norms and thereby provide domestic authorities with 
detailed guidance on how to develop a national legal framework.203 
 
As a result, Kälin has spent the last five years discussing with individual countries, 
regional blocs and the relevant institutions in the United Nations about adopting some 
guidelines regarding how to respond to displacement, including those displaced by 
natural disasters.204   
If there are any hopes to mobilizing a standardized, normative international 
response to IDPs, there must first be a list of the needs and rights to which IDPs need 
access.  Even if such a normative response never materializes or takes a long time to 
realize, a legal doctrine for IDPs would at the very minimum compile a list of the types of 
problems IDPs face.  Many critics continue to argue that international norms regarding 
IDPs can never be fully realized given its associated operational and implementation 
problems, especially when confronted by authoritarian sovereignty.  However, these 
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questions do not address any particular reason(s) why IDPs should or should not have 
legal rights associated with their displacement status; these questions are reserved for 
debates about how to implement humanitarian intervention to protect human rights.  
“Although implementation of the norms remains the main challenge, there is recognized 
value in identifying the legal principles applicable to the displaced and raising the level of 
international awareness of the problem and the need for solutions.”205  Hence, before the 
questions regarding what sort of institutional framework will be effective at addressing 
the needs of IDPs in the field can be addressed, IDPs rights and needs must first be 
outlined and agreed upon by party States.  
V. Conclusion 
The international community, comprised of sovereign states and international 
organizations, already recognizes that forced population displacement/movement puts 
displaced populations and persons into situations where security and human rights 
protection are acutely compromised.  They also recognize that there is a global IDP 
problem; given the numbers of IDPs in the world, it is hard to ignore their presence.  The 
creation and ratification of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
other human rights treaties after the Holocaust shows that the international community 
has long recognized and accepted that there is a correlative international responsibility to 
protect those who are caught in the vacuum of sovereignty, where the state is either 
unwilling or unable to provide the necessary protection and provisions to its population.   
Within the forced population community, IDPs, like refugees, require 
international action to guarantee their security and human rights.  Without equal 
protection and guarantee of rights, including to IDPs, “some human lives end up 
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mattering a great deal less to the international community than others.”206  There is no 
precedent in ethics or the law for valuing some lives more than others.  Over time, 
“[h]umanitarian appeals created interests where none previously existed and provided 
legitimate justifications for intervention that otherwise might not have been taken…”207  
Consequently, the United Nations has since been looking into developing a normative 
framework for the protection and assistance to internally displaced persons to address 
these problems.208   
The responsibility to protect is even more important today as the international 
community of states share closer interdependent ties, and with greater frequency.   
There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a 
faraway country of which we know little.’  On 11 September 2001 global 
terrorism, with its roots in complex conflicts in distant lands, struck the US 
homeland: impregnable lines of continental defence proved an illusion even for 
the world’s most powerful state.  At the same time, around 40 per cent of the 
victims of the World Trade Center attacks were non-Americans, from some 80 
countries.  In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework 
of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states 
who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that 
can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can 
constitute a risk to people everywhere.209 
 
The discussion that there ought to be an emerging international responsibility to protect 
IDPs has already occurred at the United Nations’ 2005 World Summit, emphasizing that 
the R2P principle is necessary especially when governing states fail or refuse to provide 
the necessary humanitarian provisions and protection for its (IDP) population.  According 
to the ICISS report, there is an “emerging principle…that intervention for human 
protection purposes…is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or 
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imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, 
or is itself the perpetrator.”210  However, there are logistical problems regarding how to 
implement and fulfill these obligations that prevent the responsibility to protect from 
being fully recognized on the international level.   
The first hurdle, and probably the biggest political challenge, to the notion of the 
responsibility to protect is the existence of state sovereignty.  Even in today’s heavily 
interdependent world, staunch supporters of traditional concepts of sovereignty point out 
that it is difficult to find the line between respecting sovereignty and fulfilling the 
international responsibility to protect.  However, over the last two decades, former United 
Nations Secretary-Generals Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-1992), Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
(1992-1997), and Kofi Annan (1997-2007) have all consistently emphasized that 
sovereignty can no longer be a mask behind which states hide to justify their domestic 
actions.  As early as 1991, then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar commented,  
The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of States is by itself indubitably strong.  But it would only be 
weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and 
age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of 
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling 
civil strife or insurrection.211   
 
Shortly after taking office in 1992, Boutros-Ghali presented his message in An Agenda 
for Peace.  In this speech, Boutros-Ghali also recognized that “[r]espect for its 
fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress.  
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The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed…”212  In his 
address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 1999, then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan articulated that, “[s]tate sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being 
redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation.  The State is now 
widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa.”213  And most 
recently, in 2005, the United Nations World Summit recognized the need for the United 
Nations to “take effective measures to increase the protection of internally displaced 
persons.”214  Specifically, Article 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome argues that, 
[T]o help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity[,]…we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN 
Charter, including Chapter VII…should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations…215 
 
The 2005 World Summit may be the beginning of a new UN paradigm regarding 
humanitarian violations.   
The Summit did succeed in endorsing the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a new 
principle of international conduct…Whereas the earlier High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change had endorsed the notion of a “collective 
international responsibility to protect”…the Outcome Document (following the 
Secretary-General’s report) discusses it under the rubric of human rights.  This 
suggests an aversion on the part of Member states to consider intervention for 
human protection purposes as part of the UN’s ‘standard’ practice of collective 
security.216 
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Arguably, there does seem to be an emerging norm towards recognizing and enforcing 
the international responsibility to protect. “Humanitarian appeals created interests where 
none previously existed and provided legitimate justifications for intervention that 
otherwise might not have been taken…”217 
 However, what is problematic is how to carry out such humanitarian 
interventions. 
[I]t can never be known in advance that more lives will be saved by intervention 
than will be lost by it, or that the means employed will not take on such a 
character that the moral credentials of the intervenors might begin to look little 
different from those they are fighting against…Decision-makers can argue that 
their actions were required by necessity and that there were no alternatives to stop 
the atrocities, but, even if intervention produces a surplus of good over harm, it 
will never be known whether non-violent alternatives might have achieved the 
same result at less cost.”218   
 
These odds and uncertainty regarding the success and impact of humanitarian 
interventions prevent an international normative response towards IDPs from emerging.  
But many of these legal and operational critiques could be dealt with in an internationally 
recognized document that outlines who IDPs are and prescribes their needs.  Such a 
doctrine would be the first step towards internationalizing a coordinated humanitarian 
response to IDPs.  But the problem that remains now is getting states to agree on what 
should be included in that legal doctrine.   
 One a doctrine granting legal status to IDPs is written, this will be the first step 
towards creating an internationally recognized and accepted response to IDPs.  This will 
prevent future humanitarian operations from being ad hoc, insufficient and 
uncoordinated.  Just because it may take years before this socially accepted behavior 
becomes internationalized does not mean that we ought not try for it.  
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Annex – The Guiding Principles of Internally Displaced Persons 
This paper has been an advocate for the creation of a legal doctrine granting an 
international status for IDPs that details their rights and needs.  But what has not been 
emphasized is that there is already an international document that can serve as a basis for 
future talks about what this IDP legal doctrine might look like and entail.  As a result of 
the 1996 United Nations comprehensive study on the international protection of IDPs, 
representatives from international organizations, regional bodies, nongovernmental 
organizations and research institutions under Francis Deng’s leadership drafted the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding Principles”).  The Guiding 
Principles were finalized at an expert consultation in Vienna in January 1998, hosted by 
the Government of Austria.219  Today’s most commonly accepted working definition of 
IDPs is also contained in the Guiding Principles.   
Specifically, the Guiding Principles also list thirty principles that address the 
specific problems and needs facing IDPs.  The following is an excerpt of some of the 
Guiding Principles: 
Principle 3 – (1) National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons 
within their jurisdiction.  (2) Internally displaced persons have the right to request 
and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities.  
They shall not be persecuted or punished for making such a request… 
 
Principle 6 – (1) Every human being shall have the right to be protected against 
being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence.  
(2) The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: (a) When it 
is based on policies of apartheid, “ethnic cleansing” or similar practices aimed 
at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected 
population; (b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand; (c) In cases of large-scale 
development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public 
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interests; (d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected 
requires their evacuation; and (e) When it is used as a collective punishment.  (3) 
Displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances… 
 
Principle 14 – (1) Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose his or her residence.  (2) In particular, 
internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or 
other settlements… 
 
Principle 26 – Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport and 
supplies shall be respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or 
other acts of violence… 
 
The Guiding Principles continue on to describe additional IDP rights such as protection 
against discrimination and slavery and the right to property, liberty, freedom, etc. 
These selected principles are highlighted in this annex to offer an example of 
what a legal doctrine describing the rights and provisions to which they ought to have 
access might look like.  Principles 6 and 14 explicitly list the rights to which IDPs should 
have access so there is no confusion among the various international actors such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross that work closely with IDPs.  Principle 3 is an 
example where the conditions under which international involvement and interference 
must occur are detailed.  This places burden to national authorities to protect IDPs, list 
their explicit right to such protection.  And Principle 26 addresses logistical issues such 
as the protection of humanitarian aid workers to facilitate and encourage the involvement 
of international organizations and other actors.   
The working IDP definition and its complimentary Guiding Principles are 
considered crucial in the development of an international response to IDPs because it set 
forth the “rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of internally displaced persons 
in all phases of displacement: protection against arbitrary displacement; protection and 
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assistance during displacement; and during return, resettlement and reintegration.”220 
Kälin also emphasizes:  
The Guiding Principles[’]…definition of ‘internally displaced’ includes all those 
who have left their homes and places of habitual residence involuntarily, 
whatever the circumstances, and have not crossed an international frontier. 
Furthermore, they address the full range of rights that may become relevant for 
protection against displacement, during displacement and in the context of return 
or resettlement once durable solutions become possible.  In doing so, they reflect 
the fact that internally displaced people remain citizens of the country they are in 
and do not lose, as a consequence of being displaced, the rights granted to the 
population at large.221 (emphasis in original) 
 
However, the 1998 definition remains non-binding and does not prescribe any legal status 
to IDPs.222  A month after the Guiding Principles were finalized, a resolution was adopted 
without a vote and sponsored by only fifty-five states.  The resolution recognized “that 
the protection of internally displaced persons would be strengthened by identifying, 
reaffirming and consolidating specific rights for their protection and noting the progress 
made by the Representative in developing a normative framework…”223  Today, the 
Guiding Principles have been translated into more than 40 languages have been widely 
used by many states, United Nations agencies, regional bodies, non-governmental 
organizations, international civil society organizations.224   
The importance of even a non-binding document such as the Guiding Principles is 
that it serves as the first compilation that lists the rights and addresses the needs of 
displaced persons.  Without clear international mandate regarding IDPs, “institutional 
arrangements for addressing internal displacement remain unclear while the failure to 
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assign responsibility in the field regularly weakens international response.”225 
Although the Principles do not constitute a binding instrument like a treaty, they 
do reflect and are consistent with existing international law.  They address all 
phases of displacement—providing protection against arbitrary displacement, 
offering a basis for protection and assistance during displacement, and setting 
forth guarantees for safe return, resettlement and reintegration.  It is my hope that 
in time they may attain the status of customary international law…For the time 
being, they serve as a morally binding statement that should raise awareness of 
the particular needs of internally displaced persons and provide guidance to those 
responding to their plight.226 
 
Until a legal norm emerges to sufficiently address the needs and protection issues for 
IDPs, the Guiding Principles “set standards that should put both governments and rebel 
groups on notice that their conduct is open to scrutiny and will be measured against 
specific standards.”227  The Guiding Principles provide guidance to States with internal 
displacement and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that deal with 
IDPs.228  “As a result, there is now for the first time an authoritative statement of the 
rights of internally displaced persons and the obligations of governments and other 
controlling authorities toward these populations.”229 
The purpose of the Guiding Principles is to address the specific needs of 
internally displaced persons worldwide by identifying rights and guarantees 
relevant to their protection.  The Principles reflect and are consistent with 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.  They restate 
the relevant principles applicable to the internally displaced, which are now 
widely spread out in existing instruments, clarify any grey areas that might exist, 
and address the gaps identified…They apply to the different phases of 
displacement, providing protection against arbitrary displacement, access to 
protection and assistance during displacement and guarantees during return or 
alternative settlement and reintegration.230 
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States, United Nations agencies and regional and non-governmental organizations are 
applying and utilizing Deng’s Guiding Principles as a standard.231  Since the Guiding 
Principles were drawn in 1998, the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit recognized 
them as an “important international framework for the protection of internally displaced 
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